Emory International Law Review
Volume 33

Issue 3

2019

The Restoration and Protection of Afro-Colombian Land to
Establish Equality and Mitigate Violence
Maria Claudia Fuentes

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr

Recommended Citation
Maria C. Fuentes, The Restoration and Protection of Afro-Colombian Land to Establish Equality and
Mitigate Violence, 33 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 399 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol33/iss3/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

FUENTESCOMMENTPROOFS_5.23.19

5/23/2019 10:08 AM

THE RESTORATION AND PROTECTION OF AFROCOLOMBIAN LAND TO ESTABLISH EQUALITY AND
MITIGATE VIOLENCE
ABSTRACT
As the Colombian government is attempting to achieve peace in its country
after fifty-two years of civil conflict, peace will not be attainable unless the
Colombian government addresses the vulnerable status of Afro-Colombians and
their land rights in the Pacific region of the country. The vulnerability of AfroColombians and their land rights have greatly impacted the instability in the
nation. Throughout the civil conflict, numerous bloody skirmishes occurred on
the arable lands of Afro-Colombian. These bloody skirmishes will continue
because of the desire of criminal non-government actors to take the arable land
and use it for profit. Colombian law dictates that before any development occurs
on their lands, Afro-Colombians must be consulted. This policy is known as
consulta previa. Criminal non-government actors have attempted to get around
the consulta previa through violent measures. The Colombian government has
failed to protect Afro-Colombians and their lands from these non-government
actors. In turn, the Colombian government has encouraged businesses to seek
out the arable land for development and has failed to enforce consulta previa.
This Comment argues that these policies by the Colombian government have left
Afro-Colombians vulnerable to continued violent attacks by both criminal nongovernment actors and businesses that the Colombian government supports.
This Comment proposes that to protect Afro-Colombians and their lands the
Colombian government should communicate with Afro-Colombians and
implement a stronger policy of consulta previa by using the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous People as a guideline and by granting Afro-Colombians
the ability to veto the plans that are presented to them.
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INTRODUCTION
Afro-Colombians in the Pacific Region of Colombia have uniquely endured
violent attacks on their personhood, community, and property throughout the
country’s history. Unfortunately, this remains the case today, even as many other
segments of Colombian society have begun to experience the promise of postwar prosperity and peace.
In November 2016, the Colombian government and the guerrilla group—
Fuerzas Armadas de Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) signed a peace
agreement that ended a fifty-two year conflict.1 The Colombian Civil Conflict2
led to 220,000 deaths, 7 million displacements, and around 33,000 kidnappings.3
The peace agreement signified many different things for Colombians: the end of
half a century of bloodshed,4 a boost in the economy,5 and, for internally
displaced citizens, a chance to return home.6
For the Colombians who live in major cities, such as Bogotá or Medellín,
progress from the turmoil has been underway for several years.7 In those cities,
the occurrence of violent crimes has decreased, and employment opportunities

1
See Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, Colombia’s Civil Conflict, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict; Juan Manuel Santos, The Promise
of Peace in Colombia, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/opinion/colombiapeace-process.html; Joe Parkin, Colombia Peace Process Weather Storm as FARC Hands in Weapons,
GUARDIAN (June 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/16/colombia-peace-process-farcrebels-hand-in-weapons.
2
The war between the Colombian government, the FARC and several other insurgency groups during
1964 to the present day will be referred to as the Colombian Civil Conflict. See Felter & Renwick, supra note 1.
3
Nick Miroff, The Staggering Toll of Colombian’s War with the FARC Rebels Explained in Numbers,
WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/24/thestaggering-toll-of-colombias-war-with-farc-rebels-explained-in-numbers/?utm_term=.45c53a0cc09b; see also
Colombia Kidnapping Down 92% since 2000, Police Say, BBC (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-latin-america-38450688.
4
See On Victim’s Day, Colombia Marches for Peace, ICTJ, https://www.ictj.org/multimedia/photo/
victims-day-colombia-marches-peace (demonstrating that there are Colombians that are skeptical that ending
the conflict with the FARC will end all the violence in Colombia); Matthew Holmes, Forgiveness Can Change
A Country: Colombians on Peace Deal Referendum, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/oct/01/forgiveness-can-change-a-country-colombians-on-peace-deal-referendum.
5
Michelle Caruso-Cabera, Colombian President: Peace Deal Would Boost Economy, CNBC (Oct 1.
2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/01/colombian-president-peace-deal-would-boost-economy.html.
6
Nick Miroff, Colombia’s War Has Displaced 7 million. With Peace, Will They Go Home?, WASH.
POST (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombias-war-has-displaced-7million-with-peace-will-they-go-home/2016/09/05/538df3c6-6eb8-11e6-993f-73c693a89820_story.html?utm_
term=.1756db20a945 [hereinafter Displaced 7 Million].
7
See Nell McShane Wulfhart, 36 Hours in Bogotá, Colombia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/05/travel/what-to-do-in-36-hours-in-bogota-colombia.html.
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and access to healthcare have increased.8 But for those who live in the Pacific
Region of Colombia, relief from the turmoil that characterized wartime is
currently unattainable.
Peace in the Pacific remains unattainable because violence in the area is
often connected with the desire for arable land and the facility to take land from
its occupants.9 The desire for arable land is often manifested through forceful
land grabs.10 The land can be taken from its occupants due to the lack of
protections the Colombian government provides the occupants of the Pacific
Region.11
Violent forceful acquisitions of arable lands in the Pacific Region did not
begin with the rise of the guerrillas, and such practices will not be eradicated by
peace agreements.12 The physical removal of people to acquire arable lands in
post-Independence Colombia can be traced back to the early 1800s when
landowners and the Colombian government asserted dominion over lands that
were inhabited by Afro-Colombians and Indigenous peoples.13 Wealthy
landowners and the Colombian government pushed several Afro-Colombian
groups and Indigenous peoples off the land to establish an agricultural industry
in the area.14 This physical removal detrimentally impacted Afro-Colombians’
and Indigenous peoples’ society, independence, and means of survival.15
The emergences of other violent actors such as the guerrillas, the
paramiliatares, and the cartels in the Pacific Region contributed to fights over
lands that have exacerbated the pain of Afro-Colombians and Indigenous
people,16and interest in the arable lands of the Pacific has not ended. Today, the

8
See id. Contra Kat Martindale, Researching Cities: Does Bogotá’s transformation hold up to scrutiny,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/oct/10/researching-cities-bogotatransformation-scrutiny-colombia; see Alex Warnock-Smith, Story of Cities #42: Medellín escapes grip of drug
lord to embrace radical urbanism, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/may/
13/story-cities-pablo-escobar-inclusive-urbanism-medellin-colombia; Ashoka, The Transformation of Medellīn,
and the Surprising Company Behind It, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2014/01/
27/the-transformation-of-medellin-and-the-surprising-company-behind-it/#71a5e58232cc.
9
GEORGE REID ANDREWS, AFRO-LATIN AMERICA, 1800-2000 134 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
10
Id.
11
See id.; Peter Wade, The Cultural Politics of Blackness in Colombia, 22 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 341, 345
(1995).
12
See Wade, supra note 11.
13
ANDREWS, supra note 9.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Gimena Sanchez-Garzoli, Stopping Irreparable Harm: Acting on Colombia’s Afro-Colombian and
Indigenous Communities Protection Crisis, NOREF (June 2012), https://noref.no/Publications/Themes/Globaltrends/Stopping-irreparable-harm-acting-on-Colombia-s-Afro-Colombian-and-indigenous-communities-
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fertile land of the Pacific Region is still being fought over because the lucrative
industry of palm oil cultivation requires rich land.17
This Comment will focus only on the treatment of the Afro-Colombians of
the Pacific Region.18 While Indigenous people endured transgressions similar to
those suffered by the Afro-Colombians, Afro-Colombians are unique in a sense
that the Colombian government and society historically denied their presence in
the country.19 Since Afro-Colombians’ status as a distinct group was essentially
erased from the Colombian society, the Colombian government overlooked the
unique historical and cultural connection that Afro-Colombians had to the land
in the Pacific Region and ignored the pain that Afro-Colombians endured.20
Throughout the battles for land in the Pacific, Afro-Colombians were
subjected to horrendous acts of both physical and mental depravity: families
were often removed from their homes at gunpoint; women were often raped;
and, along with their land, Afro-Colombians lost their independence and
culture.21
The Colombian government has attempted to make amends for its past
behavior of prioritizing economic development over Afro-Colombian land
rights and, in 1991, began to recognize Afro-Colombians’ ties to certain lands
in the Pacific Region through the ratification of Law 70 into its Constitution and
the establishment of consulta previa.22 These laws provided Afro-Colombians

protection-crisis/(language)/eng-US (last updated June 19, 2017).
17
Nick Miroff, In Colombia, A Palm Oil Boom with Roots in Conflict, WASH. POST ( Dec. 30, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-colombia-a-palm-oil-boom-has-its-roots-in-years-offighting/2014/12/29/ae6eb10c-796b-11e4-9721-80b3d95a28a9_story.html?utm_term=.62f18a616937
[hereinafter Palm Oil Boom]; EU Indigenous and Community Palm Oil Tour, BURNESS,
http://www.burness.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Colombia-Palm-Oil-Brief.pdf [hereinafter BURNESS];
see also C. . .sar Augusto Rodriguez-Garavito et al., Racial Discrimination and Human Rights in Colombia: A
Report on the Situation of the Rights of Afro-Colombians, GLOBAL JUST. SERIES (OBSERVATORY RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION, COLOM.) (Dec. 2008), https://cdn.dejusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/fi_name_
recurso_204.pdf.
18
For the rest of this Comment, the use of the term Afro-Colombians only refers to Afro-Colombians in
the Pacific Region. The Colombian government recognizes four distinct classifications of Afro-Colombians:
those in the Pacific Region, the raizal communities, those from the palenque, and Afro-Colombians who live in
cities. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [CONSTITUTION] July 4, 1991 [hereinafter CONSTITUTION];
see also Sascha Carolina Herrera, A History of Violence and Exclusion: Afro-Colombians From Slavery to
Displacement (Oct. 31, 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown University) (on file at Georgetown
University).
19
See Wade, supra note 11.
20
Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17.
21
ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 134.
22
CONSTITUTION, supra note 18; see Diana María Ocampo & Sebastain Agudelo, Country Study:
Colombia, AM. Q. (Spring 2014); Myriam M. . .ndez-Montalvo, Consulta Previa: A Defining Issue for Latin
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with collective title to their lands, ensured certain lands rights and recognized
the past assaults that Afro-Colombians faced on their livelihoods.23 However,
the Colombian government has failed to establish a clear policy on how to
reconcile the interests of the agricultural industry with the interests of AfroColombians.24
If the government does not reinforce the current protections to AfroColombian lands, such as consulta previa, Colombian citizens may continue to
face more violence as eager business owners and bacrim25 forcibly take AfroColombian land and assassinate Afro-Colombian leaders who attempt to assert
and protect their land rights.26 To move past the violence of the Colombian Civil
Conflict, and to truly achieve peace within the nation, the Colombian
government must prioritize the rights of Afro-Colombians over those of
corporations by truly recognizing and respecting Afro-Colombians’ rights to
land.
Safety in the Pacific will only be possible if the Colombian government does
four things: (1) moves away from its current loose legal framework of consulta
previa and stops circumventing consulta previa by (2) communicating with
Afro-Colombians, (3) using the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People
(UNDRIP) as a guideline, and (4) granting Afro-Colombians the ability to veto.
This Comment will advocate for the above proposal while examining the
attendant obstacles it faces through four interrelated subtopics: Part I will detail
a brief history of Afro-Colombians in the Pacific Region and the origins of the
modern land-rights dispute. Part II will describe the current system of laws
America, FORD FOUND.: EQUALS CHANGE BLOG (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equalschange-blog/posts/consulta-previa-a-defining-issue-for-latin-america/ (noting that consulta previa, generally, is
“the right of indigenous and ethnic communities to be consulted on matters affecting their culture and heritage.”);
see also Wade, supra note 11 (discussing Law 70 and its exclusions); Indigenous Peoples and Minorities Section,
U.N. Office High Comm’r Hum. Rts. [OHCHR] Rule of Law, Free, Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous
People (Sept. 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/FreePriorandInformedConsent.pdf. In
Colombia, indigenous and ethnic communities have certain rights over traditional or ancestral lands. Consulta
previa in Colombia dictates that the indigenous or ethnic community who have rights to a certain area of land
are consulted when companies or the government wish to use the land. Id. at 1.
23
See Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16. In the Pacific, Afro-Colombian communities in Antioquia, Valle
del Cauca, Nariño, Chocó, Cauca, and Risaralda, collectively, were granted 159 land titles, spanning over 5.2
million hectares, by the Colombian government. Id.
24
See Palm Oil Boom, supra note 17.
25
Emerging criminal bands and new paramilitaries are known by the Colombian government as “bacrim.”
Bacrim are sometimes hired by corporations as agents for the removal of lands or the protection of land. See
Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16.
26
Dan Kovalik, Colombia: Ethnocide and Political Violence on the Rise, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Mar.
28, 2016, 9:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-kovalik/colombia-ethnocide—polit_b_9556570.html
(last updated Dec. 6, 2017); see also Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17.
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protecting Afro-Colombians’ title to property. Part III will address problems
with the current system, and Part IV will propose changes that will enable the
system to provide more protections to Afro-Colombians. Part V will address
criticisms to the general concept of consulta previa.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF AFRO-COLOMBIANS IN THE PACIFIC

The Pacific Region of Colombia is a predominately rural area that lacks
access to infrastructure, healthcare, and education.27 Home to the departments
of Choco, Valle de Cauca, Cauca, and Nariño,28 the region is inhabited primarily
by Afro-Colombians, who make up ninety percent of the population.29 The
presence of Afro-Colombians in this area dates back to the 1500s.30 To
understand why Afro-Colombians have collective title to certain land and to
appreciate the connection between Afro-Colombian land and the violent landgrabs by paramilitares and guerrillas, a brief history is necessary. This section
will discuss four different time periods of Colombian history. The first section
will discuss the arrival of African slaves to Colombia and their role in
Colombian independence from Spain. The second section will discuss the
development of the Afro-Colombian society. The third section will look at the
destabilizing impact of guerrillas and paramilitaries on Colombia and AfroColombians. The fourth section will discuss how Afro-Colombians gained
recognition by the government and were granted certain rights that protected
their land and their culture.
A. Independence and Freedom
In the 1500s, Africans arrived in the Pacific Region of Colombia through the
transatlantic slave trade.31 Spaniards enslaved Africans and exploited their labor

27

Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17.
STATOID, DEPARTMENTS OF COLOMBIA, http://www.statoids.com/uco.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2018);
see also Wade, supra note 11.
29
Afro-Colombians, MINORITY RTS. GROUP INT’L., http://minorityrights.org/minorities/afro-colombians/
(last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
30
ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 17.
31
Id.; see also Herbert S. Klein & Ben Vinson III, AFRICAN SLAVERY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN (Oxford Univ. Press 2007 (discussing the transatlantic slave trade and the impact on Latin America).
28
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in gold mines, sugar haciendas,32 and cattle farms.33 Some Africans and their
descendants were able to achieve freedom prior to emancipation.34 African
slaves, free blacks, 35 and mulattos36 would play an integral role in the fight for
independence against Spain that began in the 1800s.37 Their involvement in the
fight for independence would impact their status in society. During the battles
for independence, gradual emancipation efforts occurred in liberated territories
that were no longer under Spanish rule.38 Emancipation, however, faced heavy
resistance from wealthy landowners, and slavery in the area would not officially
end until 1851.39
During the slow process of emancipation, libertos40 sought “to redefine their
living and working conditions in such a way as to negate and obliterate the
32
A hacienda is “an agricultural estate, operated by a dominant landowner and a dependent labor force,
organized to supply a small market by means of scarce capital, in which the factors of production are employed
not for capital accumulation but also to support the status aspirations of the owner.” See GRETA-FRIEDMAN
SÁNCHEZ, ASSEMBLING FLOWERS AND CULTIVATING HOMES: LABOR AND GENDER IN COLOMBIA 14 (Lexington
Books 2006) (quoting Eric Wolf & Sindey Mintz, Haciendas and Plantations in Middle America and the
Caribbean, 6 SOC. ECON. STUD. 380, 412 (1957)).
33
ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 17; Herrera, supra note 18.
34
See Marixa Lasso, MYTHS OF HARMONY: RACE AND REPUBLICANISM DURING THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION, COLOMBIA 1795 – 1831(Univ. Pittsburgh Press 2007) (referring to free blacks); see also Peter
Wade, Afro-Colombian Social Movements, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON AFRO-LATIN AMERICA (Univ.
Press of Florida 2012). Africans and their descendants who achieved freedom prior to emancipation will be
referred to as free blacks. See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 17.
35
See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 17. The term “free blacks” is used in reference to African slaves who
had runaway or had been freed. Id.
36
See id. Over the ensuing centuries, African slaves and their descendants would intermarry with both
European and Indigenous populations, becoming part of a racial classification system unique to the Spanish
colonies in the Americas, with each racial classification bringing corresponding rights and privileges. Id. at 56.
George Reid Andrews uses “mulatto” to describe someone of “known African ancestry,” and this Comment
adopts that classification. Id. at 5. However, mulatto is commonly used to refer to someone with African and
European ancestry. Mulatto, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2017).
37
ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 56. Simon Bolivar, one of the leaders of the independence movement,
originally did not think it was necessary to include the emancipation of the slaves in his nation-building project.
See Aline Helg, Simón Bolívar and the Spectre of Pardocracia: Jos. . . Padilla in Post-Independence Cartagena,
35 J. Latin American Studies 447, 449-450 (2003); see also Ishaan Tharoor, Simón Bolívar: The Latin American
Hero Many Americans Don’t Know, TIME (May 13, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/05/31/simon-bolivarthe-latin-american-hero-many-americans-dont-know/. As the war for independence went on, Bolivar realized
that if the struggle for independence was to succeed, slavery would need to end. Id. At one point, Bolivar was
given sanctuary in Haiti, and his discussions with Haitian President Alexandre P. . .tion influenced Bolivar’s
position towards slavery. Id.
38
See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 57. These policies were called libertad de vientres—”Freedom of the
Womb Laws.” Id.
39
Id. at 56. Colombia officially recognizes May 21, 1851 as the official day slavery ended. See Oliver
Sheldon, Afro-Colombian Day: An Opportunity to Celebrate Culture and Equality, COLOMBIA REPORTS (May
21, 2014), https://colombiareports.com/colombia-celebrates-afro-colombian-day/.
40
“Libertos” is the term used to refer to black slaves who fought in the wars of independence and became
free upon military service. See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 62.
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experience of slavery.”41 One way the libertos in the Pacific Region attempted
to solidify their freedom was through the acquisition and ownership of land.42
Through the land ownership, libertos found the opportunity to survive without
having to work on a hacienda as cheap labor43 and the ability to provide shelter
and food for their families.44
Land after independence was also easily accessible.45 Instability within the
country had caused crop cultivation and mining to slow down, leading the
owners of haciendas and mines to leave their lands and move to cities.46 Libertos
and other African descendants who did not move to cities would move on to not
only these lands but also on to properties that had been abandoned by the Spanish
crown but not yet reallocated by the new government.47 Several of the black
families who moved onto these abandoned lands requested grants of title from
the government. Most of the requests were denied or ignored.48 Yet, the
government took no formal steps to remove the families from the area.49 These
families would stay on the lands undeterred by the lack of government
recognition.50
One reason for the government’s lack of effort to remove Afro-Colombians
from the land, was the instability in the government.51 There were ongoing
disagreements about the nature of the nascent government and its boundaries;
and eventually, Venezuela and Ecuador would leave Gran Colombia to form
their own states.52 Following the secession of Venezuela and Ecuador, the
Republic of New Granada came into existence.53 Yet disagreements over the
new government continued. Wealthy landowners through their different political
41

Id. at 102–03.
ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 102–03; Herrera, supra note 18.
43
ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 102–03.
44
Id.
45
Id.; Herrera, supra note 18.
46
ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 102–03; Herrera, supra note 18.
47
ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 102–03.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Fernán E. González, The Colombian Conflict in Historical Perspective, 14 ACCORD 10, 15 (2004),
http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/colombian-conflict-historical-perspective. Gran Colombia was comprised of
modern-day Colombia, Panama, Venezuela, and Ecuador. See Gran Colombia, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA
(July 22, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/place/Gran-Colombia.
52
Harvey F. Kline et al., Colombia: Revolution and Independence, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (Feb.
26, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/place/Colombia/Revolution-and-independence.
53
González, supra note 51. The Republic of New Granada encompassed modern day Colombia and
Panama. Viceroyalty of New Granada, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.britannica.
com/place/Viceroyalty-of-New-Granada.
42
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parties, el partido liberal and el partido conservador, would cause the state to
go through several civil wars and constitutional changes.54
Following independence, the dispute between wealthy landowners over
governance dominated the political sphere of Colombia.55 These wealthy
landowners fought for control of the Colombian government and caused the
government’s attention and resources to focus on the major cities, leaving those
in the countryside, like the Afro-Colombians, to fend for themselves.56 The lack
of presence from the Colombian government allowed Afro-Colombians to live
on abandoned land undisturbed for around one hundred years.57 This time spent
isolated from the rest of the country is one of the reasons for the creation of Law
70 and the practice of consulta previa.58 Both policies acknowledge the different
history of Afro-Colombians and attempt to protect their culture.59
B. Development of Afro-Colombian Society Post-Independence
As the Colombian state was forming, Afro-Colombians were mostly ignored
by the Colombian leadership.60 This allowed the Afro-Colombians who moved
onto abandoned land in the Pacific to develop a socio-economic structure of their
own, entitled troncos.61 Troncos (tree trunks) dictated the use and allocation of
land by using a system based on inheritance, in which the families who first
arrived and cleared the land, received a portion of that land and that portion was
passed on to other family members.62 Family members had a right to reside,
work, and inherit the minas (mines), which were mining lands, and the
chagras—the ancestral land used for agriculture and cattle, which consisted of

54
See id. at 10, 12–13. List of wars: La Violencia (1948–1958), Guerra Civil (1860–1862), Guerra Civil
de 1876, Guerra de los Mil Días (1899–1902). Timeline of Colombian governments: República de la Nueva
Granada (1831–1858), Confederación Granadina (1858–1863), Estados Unidos de Colombia (1863–1886),
República de Colombia (1886–present day). The disputes between wealthy landowners will be discussed in more
detail later.
55
See Herrera, supra note 18, at 28.
56
Id.
57
See Wade, supra note 11, at 345.
58
See L. 70, agosto 27, 1993, DIARIO OFFICIAL [D.O], translated in Norma & Peter Jackson, Law 70
of Colombia (1993): In Recognition of the Right of Black Colombians to Collectively Own and Occupy their
Ancestral Lands., Benedict College (1993), www.benedict.edu/exec_admin/intnl_programs/other_files/bcintnl_programs-law_70_of_colombia-english.pdf; Herrera, supra note 18, at 16–34.
59
See L. 70, supra note 58; Ocampo & Agudelo, supra note 22.
60
See id.
61
See Herrera, supra note 18, at 19; Stella Rodriguez, Fronteras Fijas, Valor De Cambio y Cultivos
Ilícitos en el Pacífico Caucano de Colombia [Fixed Frontiers, Exchange Value and Illicit Crops in the Colombian
Pacific Coast], 44 REVISTA COLOMBIANA DE ANTROPOLOGÍA 42, 47–48 (2008).
62
Rodriguez, supra note 61, at 48.
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land used for agriculture.63 The right could be inherited from the paternal or the
maternal side, depending on the choice of the one exercising the right.64 The
system also had rules on how to rent and sell land.65 As well as what happened
to the land during certain life events such as divorce or migration.66 During this
time, Afro-Colombians mainly lived off subsistence agriculture, fishing,
logging, and mining.67
By the beginning of the twentieth century, changes to the Afro-Colombian
way of life and the troncos system that governed their lives were under increased
threat from outside forces.68 Colombia began to export coffee bringing more
wealth into the country and renewing interest in the fertile Pacific Region.69 The
Colombian government and wealthy landowners returned to the Pacific Region
to reclaim the land that they had previously abandoned to use for the cultivation
of cash crops.70 Together, the government and wealthy landowners acted in
conjunction to remove, often violently, the Afro-Colombians from the lands they
had lived and worked on for generations.71 These forced seizures reduced many
Afro-Colombians from landowners to mere tenants of their own homes and
wage-laborers on their own lands.72 Dispossession was enhanced by the creation
of a railroad that went from Cali to the Pacific coast.73 As these newly-arrived
landowners continued to increase their wealth and influence in the region, the
status of Afro-Colombians diminished.74
During the 1940s, Afro-Colombians faced another threat to their way of
living. The Colombian Government initiated a credit program that attempted to
regulate land tenure and titling leading to a “massive exploitation of wood, cattle
ranching, oil palm plantations, and shrimp ponds.”75 Some Afro-Colombians
applied for these loans to engage in the agricultural and logging industries but

63

Id.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Herrera, supra note 18, at 2.
68
See id.
69
See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 117, 134.
70
See id. at 134; see also Wade, supra note 11, at 345 (discussing the Colombian government’s handsoff approach to the Pacific Region).
71
See ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 134.
72
See Herrera, supra note 18, at 26, 30.
73
ANDREWS, supra note 9, at 134.
74
See. id.
75
Herrera, supra note 18, at 25 (citing GENTE NEGRA EN COLOMBIA: DINÁMICAS SOCIOPOLITICAS EN
CALI Y EL PACIFICO 206 (Oliver Barbary & Fernando Urrera eds. 2004)).
64
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also as a means of regaining their land.76 However, they were frequently
outcompeted by corporate agricultural and logging operations, and often lost
their territory to foreclosure.77
While isolated from the rest of the country, Afro-Colombians created a
culture and, with the establishment of troncos, a system that was distinctly
theirs.78 Yet, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Afro-Colombians saw
their lives change drastically.79 The society that they had developed was
impacted by the sudden incursion of the government and wealthy landowners,
as many of Afro-Colombians were forcibly moved off their lands for the sake of
government sponsored, private-economic activities.80 These activities, justified
as economic development initiatives, negatively affected Afro-Colombians and
their culture.81 Indeed, the disastrous impact of government development
projects and outside private enterprise on Afro-Colombian society has been
formally recognized by the Colombian government, as demonstrated by the
adoption of Law 70 and consulta previa.82 These laws were designed to formally
recognize past harmful practices and ensure their discontinuation.83
C. Guerrillas & Paramilitaries
Afro-Colombians, already suffering from the loss of their lands, also had to
contend with the disastrous consequences of another Colombian civil war: La
Violencia.84 The war formally lasted for a ten-year period, but its destabilizing
effects continue to impact Colombia today.85 La Violencia began in 1948 and
lasted until 1958. During that period, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party,
and Communist supporters fought throughout the Colombian countryside,
leading to the death of around 200,000 people.86 During this time, Afro-

76

Id.
Id.
78
See Herrera, supra note 18, at 19–21.
79
Id. at 24.
80
Id. at 26–26.
81
Id.
82
See L. 70, supra note 58; Ocampo & Agudelo, supra note 22.
83
Ocampo & Agudelo, supra note 22.
84
La Violencia is the term used to refer to the civil war of 1948-1958. See William Paul McGreevey, et.
al., Colombia: La Violencia, Dictatorship, and Democratic Restoration, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Colombia/La-Violencia-dictatorship-and-democratic-restoration.
85
Id. Following La Violencia, the communist supporters fled to rural areas of Colombia and began the
FARC. See Felter & Renwick, supra note 1.
86
McGreevey, supra note 84; see also World Peace Found., Colombia: La Violencia, MASS ATROCITY
ENDINGS (Dec. 14, 2016), https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/colombia-la-violencia-2/.
77
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Colombians, although isolated, were not immune from the turmoil that engulfed
the rest of the country.87
Following the formal end of La Violencia, peasants in the countryside who
had mobilized to ward off the violence turned into the guerrilla group FARC.88
Over time more guerrilla groups would form such as the Ejército de Liberación
Nacional (ELN), the M-19, and the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL).89
These guerrilla groups instigated violence throughout the country.90 In response,
landowners and wealthy businessmen, with the support of the Colombian
government, created right-wing paramilitary organizations to protect their
interests.91 The emerging mosaic of violent confrontations between the
numerous armed groups in Colombia grew more dire and more complicated with
the development of the drug trade and the drug cartels. In the 1970s, marijuana
growth in Colombia bred “nouveau riche” drug traffickers, which turned into the
drug cartels of Medellin and Cali.92 As the drug cartels grew more powerful,
some drug traffickers created their own paramilitary groups to acquire more land
to grow coca and marijuana.93
The arable lands of the Pacific were useful in the cultivation of coca and
marijuana and many Afro-Colombians were once again dispossessed of their
lands — this time to make way for drug cultivation.94 Certain guerrillas became
involved in the drug trade, which caused problems between the cartels and the
guerrillas.95 The Medellin Cartel’s paramilitary arm began to work with the
Colombian government to fight off the guerrillas.96 Yet, the Medellin Cartel and
the Colombian government would also continue to fight amongst each other.97
While the battles between the guerrillas, paramilitaries, cartels and the
Colombian military occurred throughout the entire country, they were especially
frequent on and near land inhabited by Afro-Colombians.98
87

See McGreevey, supra note 84.
See Lawrence Boudon, Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process,
28 J. LATIN-AMERICAN STUD. 279, 280 (1996).
89
Id.
90
See Boudon, supra note 88, at 280; see also Winfred Tate, Paramilitaries in Colombia, 8 BROWN J.
WORLD AFF. 163, 164 (2001).
91
See Tate, supra note 90, at 194–95; see also González, supra note 51.
92
Tate, supra note 90, at 165; see also González, supra note 51, at 13.
93
Tate, supra note 90, at 165.
94
Id.; see also González, supra note 51, at 13.
95
Felter & Renwick, supra note 1; see Tate, supra note 90, at 165; see also González , supra note 51, at
13–14.
96
Tate, supra note 90, at 166.
97
Id.
98
Herrera, supra note 13, at 3–4, 103.
88
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To contextualize the current threats that Afro-Colombians face today, one
needs to understand the destabilizing effects that the rise of the cartels— in
combination with the presence of guerrillas and paramilitares— had on AfroColombians and the entire country. The arable land of the Pacific was a vital
commodity for these groups and led to numerous battles over the control of the
land.99 These fights caused the displacement of thousands of Colombians,
especially Afro-Colombians, who fled into overcrowded cities.100 The turmoil
directly impacted the lives of Afro-Colombians, as many saw family members
and friends die during land disputes.101 The constant struggle between the
cartels, guerrillas, and paramilitares for control of fertile land with the capacity
of drug cultivation was one of the main reasons Afro-Colombians lost such a
vast amount of their land and their cohesiveness as a community.102 As efforts
to restore Afro-Colombians’ land rights occur under the authority of Law 70 and
through the implementation of consulta previa, these actors continue to present
a direct threat against that initiative.103
D. Recognition
By the end of the twentieth century, the Colombian Civil Conflict had
devastated the lives of countless Afro-Colombians.104 The fights between the
guerrillas, paramilitares, the cartels, and the Colombian government were often
fought directly on their lands.105 With continuing loss of control of their lands,
Afro-Colombians had to seek other avenues for sustenance and shelter. Some
Afro-Colombians got involved in the drug trade or joined either guerrillas or
paramilitary groups.106
Afro-Colombians who stayed in the region endured numerous traumatic
events such as violence, displacement, and loss of family members.107 These
99
Hisham Aidi, Afro-Colombians Face Surge in Racial Violence, AL JAZEERA (July 18, 2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/07/afro-colombians-face-surge-racial-violence-150707094927
679.html.
100
Louise Højen, Colombia’s “Invisible Crisis”: Internally Displaced Persons, COUNCIL HEMISPHERIC
AFF. (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.coha.org/colombias-invisible-crisis-internally-displaced-persons/. AfroColombians fled the area to overcrowded cities, adding to the number of internally displaced people and creating
more problems for the government. See Displaced 7 Million, supra note 6.
101
Aidi, supra note 99.
102
Id.
103
Id. Guerrillas, paramilitaries, cartels, and the Colombian government are all threats to Afro-Colombian
restoration of land. Id.
104
Displaced 7 Million, supra note 6.
105
Afro-Colombians, supra note 29.
106
Id. Some Afro-Colombians would also join the Colombian military. Id.
107

See Displaced 7 Million, supra note 6; Aidi, supra note 99, Afro-Colombians, supra note 29.
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traumatic events exacerbated the condition of Afro-Colombians who did not
have access to substantial social resources.108 Compared to other parts of the
country during the 1990s, the Pacific was considerably more impoverished and
less attended to by the national government.109 The area lacked paved roads, and
in certain parts, like Choco, Afro-Colombians traveled in raft-like boats along
river channels.110 This created problems when violence broke out and AfroColombians attempted to flee.111 The lack of roads also made access to health
care difficult;112 this was particularly damaging considering the pre-existing
health risks created by the “scarcity of running water, potable water and sewage
systems” in this area.113 With so many issues plaguing the Pacific, AfroColombians felt abandoned by the rest of their country.114
Seeking to reinforce democracy and stabilize the country after all the
violence during the Colombian Civil Conflict, government officials sought to
enact a new constitution.115
Once they learned of the potential for a new constitution, Afro-Colombians
began to mobilize and attempted to acquire representation in the constitutional
assembly.116 Their platform was based on the desire to regain the stability that
they once had during the troncos era, and to regain that stability, they sought
title to the ancestral lands that they had called home since independence in the
1800s.117 However, their land claim was rejected because the Colombian
Institute for Agrarian Reform would not recognize Afro-Colombians as an
108

See Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17, at 48.
See Wade, supra note 11, at 342
110
James Brooke, Long Neglected, Colombia’s Blacks Win Changes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/29/world/long-neglected-colombia-s-blacks-win-changes.html?pagewanted=
all.
111
Afro-Colombians and Indigenous Groups at Risk From Fresh Fighting, UNHCR (Nov. 3, 2006),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2006/11/454b48392/afro-colombians-indigenous-groups-risk-freshfighting.html. The article mentions the difficulties that Embera families, who are indigenous, have had fleeing
while on rafts. Id. Yet Afro-Colombians in the Choco area also use boats to travel and face similar attacks, they
also have encountered the difficulties of fleeing from violence while on a raft. Id.
112
See Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17, at 48. The difficult Colombian terrain and the internal
conflicts also exasperate the health care problems. Id.
113
Id.
114
Brooke, supra note 110.
115
Donald T. Fox, et al., Lessons of the Colombian Constitutional Reform of 1991: Toward the Securing
Peace and Reconciliation, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION
MAKING 467, 470 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010); see also Wade, supra note 11, at 346 (discussing how
constitutional reform was a concession during the peace talks with the guerrilla group, M-19). Another positive
measure for Afro-Colombians was that the Constitutional Court outlawed CONVIVIR, a right-wing paramilitary
group in 1997. See Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16, at 2.
116
Yesenia Barragan, To End 500 Years of Great Terror, 49 NACLA REP. AM. 56, 58–59 (Mar. 14, 2017).
117
Dixon, supra note 115; see also Herrera, supra note 18, at 28; Rodriguez, supra note 61, at 48–49.
109
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ethnic community, which was a pre-requisite to receive collective title.118 In
response, Afro-Colombian communities collected signatures and protested the
rejection by peacefully occupying government buildings in Quibdo.119
These protests were impactful; thus, in 1993, the Colombian government
enacted Law 70 to the 1991 Constitution, adding language that recognized the
existence of Afro-Colombians.120 Never before had the Colombian government
acknowledged the existence of Afro-Colombians and their distinct cultural
identity until the passing of Law 70.121 Law 70 bound the Colombian
government by granting protected rights to Ethnic communities, including AfroColombians122 The law also granted specific land rights to Afro-Colombians.123
More information on Law 70 will be provided in the next section of this
Comment.
The hope that recognition by the government and the establishment of
collective title to land would bring about change died quickly. Even in recent
decades, Afro-Colombians continue to face terrible violence. One example is the
massacre in Bojayá where, on May 2, 2002, seventy-nine people were killed in
the crossfires of a fight between paramilitaries and the FARC.124
Furthermore, the perpetrators of violent land acquisition in the Pacific
Region have a new motivation: the cultivation of African oil palms.125 Oil palm
production has now become a lucrative business in Colombia, particularly in the
Pacific Region, where most of the product is grown.126 Colombia is currently
Latin America’s largest producer of oil palms.127 The cultivation of oil palm has
helped boost the Colombian economy,128 and, as a result, the Colombian
government plans to increase production “six-fold by 2020.”129 Yet, the
118

Dixon, supra note 115.
Id. Quibdo is the capital of Chocó. Quibdo, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
place/Quibdo.
120
L. 70, supra note 58; see also Tianna S. Paschel, The Right to Difference: Explaining Colombia’s Shift
From Color Blindness to the Law of Black Communities, 116 AM. J. SOC. 729, 730 (2010).
121
Paschel, supra note 121 (discussing Colombian “color-blindness”); see also WADE, supra note 11, at
349 (discussing how Afro-Colombians were no longer invisible following the implementation of Law 70).
122
L. 70, supra note 58; see also WADE, supra note 11, at 349 (discussing Law 70 and its exclusions).
123
L. 70, supra note 58; see also WADE, supra note 11, at 349.
124
Sofía del Carril & Míriam Juan-Torres, Peace in Colombia: The Tale of Bojayá, YALE J. INT’L AFF.
(Apr. 6, 2016), http://yalejournal.org/photo-essay_post/peace-in-colombia-the-tale-of-bojaya/. The Colombian
military arrived four days later. Id.; see Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16, at 2.
125
Palm Oil Boom, supra note 17.
126
Id
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Aditi Sen & Stephanie Burgos, The Next Frontier for Palm Oil Expansion: Latin America, OXFAM:
119

FUENTESCOMMENTPROOFS_5.23.19

414

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

5/23/2019 10:08 AM

[Vol. 33

cultivation of oil palms presents a problem for Afro-Colombians and their goal
to regain control of their lands, as well as preserve their culture.130
While violent and illegal land grabs in the Pacific were often for the
cultivation of illicit crops, there has recently been a rise of interested actors131
forcibly taking land for oil palm cultivation.132 Several townspeople have been
violently forced off their lands, and their towns have been demolished to make
room for the cultivation of African oil palms.133 These forced removals are often
performed by bacrim who are paid by corporations that ultimately reap the
benefits of forced removals in the form of free fertile land.134
One such town located in the center of Colombia, Mapiripán, was under the
control of the FARC when it was attacked during July of 1997.135 A week later,
the town stood in shambles after a fight between paramilitaries and the FARC.
Towns people, who were caught amongst the crossfire, “[were] torn limb from
limb while still alive.”136 Following the massacre, most of the town’s citizens
fled to nearby cities.137 Cecila Lozano was one of those who fled Mapiripán.138
She never understood why her town was attacked until she returned home, two
years later, and saw her home replaced by oil palm groves.139
Jiguamiandó and Curvaradó are two Afro-Colombian areas where
displacement of Afro-Colombians has occurred to accommodate the production

THE POLITICS OF POVERTY (Oct. 26, 2016), https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2016/10/the-nextfrontier-for-palm-oil-expansion-latin-america/.
130
See Urlich Oslender, Violence in Development: The Logic of Forced Displacement on Colombia’s
Pacific Coast, 17 DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE 752 (2007).
131
Interested persons can include: corporations, paramilitaries (or now bacrim) and guerrillas.
132
Hannah Brock, Marginalisation of the Majority World: Drivers of Insecurity and the Global South,
OXFORD RES. GRP. (Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/marginalisation-of-the-majorityworld-drivers-of-insecurity-and-the-global-south (citing Amira Armenta, Marginalisation of the Majority
World: Crime and Insecurity in Colombia, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE); see also Palm Oil Boom, supra note
12.
133
María Cristana Caballero, Mapiripan: A Shortcut to Hell, CTR PUB. INTEGRITY (July 28, 1997, 6:49
PM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/1997/07/28/3357/mapiripan-shortcut-hell.
134
See Resisting Displacement by Combatants and Developers: Humanitarian Zones in North-West
Colombia, NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL (Nov. 2007), http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/
publications/2007/200711-Dam-colombia-resisting-displacement-by-combatants-and-developers-countryen.pdf [hereinafter Resisting Displacement].
135
Caballero, supra note 110.
136
Id.
137
Palm Oil Boom, supra note 17; see also BURNESS, supra note 17.
138
Palm Oil Boom, supra note 17.
139
Palm Oil Boom, supra note 17; see BURNESS, supra note 17; see also Oil Palm Cultivation (Palm Oil)
Guide, AGRIFARMING, http://www.agrifarming.in/oil-palm-cultivation/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).
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of oil palms.140 The displacement of Afro-Colombians in Jiguamiandó and
Curvaradó began in the 1990s when farmers and landowners, who received
financial backing from the illegal drug trade, “used threats and harassment to
banish the [Afro-Colombians] and appropriate their land.”141 Once AfroColombians fled their land, oil palm plantations took the place of AfroColombian homes.142
As seen by the land grabs in Jiguamiandó and Curvaradó, other AfroColombian communities are likely to experience what the people of Mariripan
underwent: a complete loss of their homes through violent land acquisition as
the Colombian government encourages the development of African oil palms in
the country. While the people of Mapiripán are not Afro-Colombian, their
experience demonstrates a common phenomenon in Colombia: the taking of
land for lucrative industries.
With the rise of the oil palm industry, Afro-Colombians not only fear attacks
over the acquisition of their land but also intimidation or retaliation against their
community leaders.143 Throughout the intersecting histories of the AfroColombian struggle for collective lands rights and the growth of the oil palm
sector, several Afro-Colombian leaders have been assassinated.144 In February
of 1996, Francisco Hurtado, a legal representative elected for the council of the
lower Mira River was murdered.145 The man who shot Hurtado is reported to
have said “why don’t you continue screwing around with this business of your
Law 70!”146 In 2008, a leader of a community council in the Mira Region was
assassinated.147 A note threatening the community to end its activism was found
near the body.148
While the Colombian government has initiated policies to protect AfroColombian land rights and culture, these policies fall short.149 The Colombian
government’s encouragement of the oil palm industry and the desire of
businessmen, as well as bacrim,150 to make money off the crop, has perpetuated
140

Brock, supra note 132, at 6–7; see also BURNESS, supra note 17.
Brock, supra note 132, at 6–7; see also BURNESS, supra note 17.
142
Brock, supra note 132, at 6–7; see also BURNESS, supra note 17.
143
BURNESS, supra note 17.
144
See Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17, at 37; see also Asesinado líder afro en Nariño, AGENCIA
PRENSA RURAL (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article22624.
145
Rodriguez-Garavito et al., supra note 17, at 37.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16, at 2.
150
Emerging criminal bands and new paramilitaries are known by the Colombian government as “bacrim.”
141
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the violent acquisitions of Afro-Colombian land. Without stability in the region,
there can be no meaningful improvements to healthcare or infrastructure. More
importantly, unless the government acts on the promise of Law 70 and consulta
previa by enforcing Afro-Colombian collective land rights, the incentive for
armed groups to forcibly take lands from those with no enforceable claims will
remain and the violence that Afro-Colombians have endured for decades will
not end.151
II. PROTECTIONS OF LAND
To rectify the years of government neglect of Afro-Colombians and the
abuse Afro-Colombians have faced throughout their history, the Colombian
government has signed treaties and created laws that recognize AfroColombians as a distinct ethnic community in Colombia.152 These laws compel
the government to consider the land rights of Afro-Colombians. This section will
look at the laws that the Colombian government has enacted to rectify the
mistreatment of Afro-Colombians. First, this section will look at the legal
framework that recognizes Afro-Colombians as a distinct group in Colombia
and establishes a system of consultation between Afro-Colombians, the
government, and corporations. Second, this section will look at this system of
consulta previa, which ensures that Afro-Colombians have a say on what occurs
on their lands.
A. Creation of Protections for Afro-Colombians
The Colombian government has made progress from its past practice of
ignoring the presence and plight of Afro-Colombians in the country to
acknowledging Afro-Colombian’s territorial and cultural identity. The
Colombian government’s recognition of Afro-Colombians began in the early
1990s.153 In 1991, the Colombian government signed a new constitution, which
established protections for the cultural identity of ethnic communities.154 AfroColombians fell under the broad description of “ethnic communities.” Shortly
after the new constitution went into effect, the Colombian government ratified
the International Labour Organization convention on Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples (ILO 169) which guaranteed the right of indigenous peoples by
Bacrim are sometimes hired by corporations as agents for the removal of lands or the protection of land. See
Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 61, at 2.
151
Palm Oil Boom, supra note 17; see also BURNESS, supra note 17.
152
L. 70, supra note 58.
153
Id.
154
Id.

FUENTESCOMMENTPROOFS_5.23.19

2019]

PROTECTION OF AFRO-COLOMBIAN LAND

5/23/2019 10:08 AM

417

requiring their free, prior, and informed consent before actions occurred on their
land.155 Then in 1993, the Colombian government adopted ILO 169 into its own
laws with the passage of Law 70.156
While ILO 169 detailed the rights of indigenous peoples, Colombia’s Law
70 expanded the scope of ILO 169 to embrace other ethnic communities,
including Afro-Colombians of the Pacific Region. Law 70 acknowledged that
Afro-Colombians had been living in rural areas of the Pacific and independently
governing themselves under the troncos system.157 The Law established that
Afro-Colombians had a right to collective title on the lands that they had
traditionally inhabited.158 Because of Afro-Colombians’ rights to ancestral
lands, the Colombian government and corporations would now have to consult
with Afro-Colombians prior to any use of Afro-Colombian land.159 The law also
mandated that each enclave of Afro-Colombians establish a community council
that would represent their area during these consultations.160 The process of
consultation between ethnic groups and corporations is known as consulta
previa among the Spanish speaking Latin-American countries or free, prior and
informed consent (FPIC), in English.161
With these laws, Colombia has some of the most progressive declarations
for ethnic communities in Latin America.162 However, these progressive
declarations belie the unwillingness of the Colombian government to enforce
these rights.
B. Current System of Consulta Previa
To understand the potential pitfalls of consulta previa, it is important to have
a basic understanding of how the consultation process is supposed to work. Even

155
Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) dictates that indigenous groups or ethnic communities must
first consent to acts by third parties, such as industries on their lands, before third parties proceed to act. FPIC
ensures that indigenous or ethnic communities have a voice in what occurs on their lands. See Int’l Lab. Org.
[ILO], Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, pt. II, ILO No. 169 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991),
http://www.humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/C169-Indigenous-and-Tribal-Peoples-Convention.pdf
[hereinafter ILO No. 169]; see also OHCHR, supra note 22.
156
L. 70, supra note 58.
157
Id.
158
159
160

Id. See also: Beyond Slavery pg. 179.
L. 70, supra note 58.

Id.
Carlos Andr. . .s Baquero Díaz, Contested Lands Contested Laws: What’s Going Wrong in South
America with the Development and Application of the Domestic Laws to Implement, AM. Q. 107 (Spring 2014),
https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/contested-lands-contested-laws.
162
Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16, at 5.
161
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though the consultation process is much more of a unilateral process where the
corporations have most the bargaining power. The process, at least conceptually,
happens in three phases: filing, consultation, and monitoring. Criticisms of the
system will be discussed in the next section, but it is important to note that the
system of consulta previa was primarily developed by the Constitutional Court,
and the framework created by the case law has not been respected by
corporations or bacrim, who often ignore the process altogether.163
Colombia’s filing process is emblematic of the investor-oriented approach
the country has taken to consulta previa. In Colombia, consulta previa depends
on the initiative of a potential investor or organization.164 The potential investor
or organization recognizes whether consulta previa may be necessary and files
a project request with the Dirección de Consulta Previa (DCP).165 The DCP
ensures that the project request was properly filed.166 Once the request is
properly filed, the DCP determines whether the project will require consulta
previa. This step may require a visit to the area involved.167 At some point, the
DCP begins to contact the ethnic or indigenous group.168 If the communities do
not respond, the DCP turns to the Defensoría del Pueblo,169 Procuraduría
General de la Nacion,170 and the Instituto Colombiano de Antropologia e
Historia171 to discuss whether the project should proceed.172 However, if the
community does respond to the DCP, the DCP then helps facilitate the
consultation between the ethnic community and the third-party planning to make
use of the land.173
The consultation phase begins with a pre-consultation meeting between the
DCP and the ethnic group.174 The DCP presents information about consulta
previa and the rights the group has.175 Together, the DCP and the group
determines how the consultation will be “carried out.”176 The DCP also provides
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information on the project to the ethnic community.177 The next step is for an
actual consultation between the project investor or organization with the ethnic
group. The DCP oversees the meeting. The purpose of the consultation stage is
to create an agreement between the investor and the ethnic group.178 At this
phase of the process, consultations often become frustrated due to an information
imbalance between the ethnic community councils and the investor. Following
the consultation stage, is the monitoring phase. At this stage, an agreement
should already be in place and a monitoring process as well as a schedule for
follow-up meetings should be determined.179
With the ratification of the new constitution, the signing of the ILO 169 and
the passing of Law 70, the Colombian government not only recognized AfroColombians as a distinct group in Colombian society but also delineated specific
rights for Afro-Colombians to preserve their culture and to protect their lands.180
While these laws seemed like a step in the right direction towards ensuring AfroColombians’ ability to enforce their collective property rights against interested
actors who seek their land, these laws fall short and attacks on Afro-Colombians
have persisted.181
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT LAWS
There are several factors that limit the protections that the current laws
establish for Afro-Colombians, but this comment will discuss two main factors.
First, Law 70 does not guarantee Afro-Colombians complete control over their
lands because it does not provide Afro-Colombians with the ability to veto
projects during the consulta previa process.182 Second, Colombia’s system of
consulta previa was not established by a legislature and is a system of “scattered
norms, guidelines, decrees, and presidential directives” that the Colombian
government can ignore when it sees fit.183 These shortcomings provide avenues
for corporate interests to triumph over the rights of Afro-Colombians.
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A. Structural Problems with Consulta Previa
Consulta previa does not provide insight as to what would occur if AfroColombians veto a project. The Colombian version of consulta previa does not
answer that question because neither ILO 169 nor Law 70 clearly address the
possibility.184 Yet this question deserves to be answered because the lack of a
veto limits the ability of Afro-Colombians to protect their cultural and territorial
integrity.185 If Afro-Colombians are approached by a corporation with a project
that will involve activities that they do not wish to allow on their lands and
negotiations between the Colombian government, the corporation, and AfroColombians are not successful, what can the Afro-Colombians do? They must
continue to negotiate, and, as past actions show, the Colombian government
tends to side with corporations.186 In fact, international law also tends to side
with corporations in such negotiations maintaining that the exploitation of
natural resources on Indigenous land by corporations is considered legal “as long
as Indigenous rights to consultation, participation and redress . . . are met.” 187
The inability to say no to a project reveals the consultation process for what it
is—a façade.
Ultimately, ethnic populations are faced with the choice between entering
into a one-sided consultation process or refusing to participate and losing what
little agency they do have. Corporations can play along when they see fit but
know that at the end of the day, their deal will get done. How can AfroColombians fully protect their lands if each consultation process essentially
requires that the Afro-Colombians give their consent?

184
ILO 169 and the ILO Committee do provide certain protections to ethnic groups that ensure their ability
to protect their territorial and cultural integrity. ILO No. 169, supra note 155. ILO 169 states that free and
informed consent should occur prior to any relocation. Id. If consent is not granted, states must “follow
procedures established under national law to allow for the ‘effective representation’ of the communities involved
before relocating them.” Id. The ILO Committee has stated that the rights of ethnic groups may be subordinate
to the interests of the state if the state “retains ownership of subsoil resources” and adheres with the following:
discusses with the ethnic group prior to exploration or exploitation on the land, establishes the effect of the
project, provides the ethnic group a “fair share of the benefits accruing from any natural resource extraction,”
and provides “fair compensation for any damages caused by the []exploration and exploitation.” Id.; see also
Angela Bunch, Contradiction in International Law: Do Communities Get a Veto? International Law Isn’t Clear
on the Matter, AM. Q. (Spring 2014).
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B. Problems with the Implementation of Consulta Previa
Since the ratification of the ILO 169 and the enactment of Law 70, the
Colombian government has failed to implement a clear structure of consulta
previa.188 This lack of statutory structure allows the Colombian government to
disregard consulta previa when it sees fit and leaves Afro-Colombians in
danger.189 This section will discuss examples of when the Colombian
government has engaged in activities that directly contradict consulta previa and
aggravate the structural shortcomings that already exist. This section will also
acknowledge the role that the Colombian Constitutional Court has played in
ensuring that the Colombian government adheres to Law 70 and consulta previa.
This section will then discuss how the current presidential administration has
approached the land rights of Afro-Colombians.
1. Contradictory Policies of the Colombian Government
One government activity that directly contradicted the principles of consulta
previa was the passage of Law 99, which created a national authority, el
Ministero de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible.190 In addition to the creation of
the environmental authority, the law also required consultation with ethnic
communities prior to “granting environmental licenses whenever extractive
projects . . . were expected to have an impact on ethnic communities.”191 The
government also implemented decree 1320 in 1998 to regulate Law 99.192 The
decree “provide[d] guidelines for analyzing the economic, environmental,
social, and cultural impacts of natural resource extraction on Indigenous and
Afro-descendant communities within their territories, and at the same time
established a set of measures that would protect their integrity.”193 While all of
these regulations seem to be for the benefit of ethnic communities, such as the
Afro-Colombians, these regulations occurred without prior consultation from
such communities,194 ignoring the objectives of consulta previa.195
188

Ocampo & Agudelo, supra note 22.
Id.; Adam Wolsky, Summary: The Perils and Promise of Consulta Previa, AS/COA (July 23, 2014),
http://www.as-coa.org/articles/summary-perils-and-promise-consulta-previa. It is also important to note that the
displacement of several Afro-Colombians makes it hard to correctly implement consulta previa since more than
60% the Afro-Colombians who possess legal titles to collective lands are currently internally displaced and thus
cannot contribute to the process. Sanchez-Garzoli, supra note 16.
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In the 1990s, the communities of Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó began fighting
for recognition of their collective right to ancestral land and for the protection of
their territory.196 Oil palm investors and cultivators had taken lands in both
Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó by harassing families to the point that they were
forced to relocate. 197 In 2001, the communities in Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó
were finally granted collective title to the lands they fled several years earlier.198
Such declarations by the state granted the communities the privilege of taking
part in the consulta previa process. However, formal recognition by the
Colombian government as an ethnic community was not followed by restitution
to their homes, and members of both communities remain displaced.199 Such
treatment led to criticism from international organizations. The Inter-American
Commission for Human Rights issued “provisional measures of protection upon
learning that the harassment had not stopped.”200 Similarly, the International
Labor Organization (ILO) found that the Colombian government violated
consulta previa in its treatment of the communities in Curvaradó and
Jiguamiandó, and the organization requested that the government fulfill the
consultation requirement and “guarantee the restitution of the lands.”201
Despite criticism from international organizations, from 2006 to 2010, the
Colombian government continued to circumvent consulta previa to pass laws
that would facilitate Colombia’s compliance with free trade agreements.202 The
Forestry Law of 2006, the Rural Development Statute of 2007, and the reforms
to the Mining Code of 2010 were all passed for the purpose of meeting the
demands of free trade agreements,203 and all three legal measures had a direct
impact on lands inhabited by ethnic communities.204 However, the Colombian
government failed to comply with the mandate of consulta previa and never
entered the consultation process with the affected communities.205
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In 2006, the Colombian government also initiated the implementation of the
National Plan for Territorial Consolidation, which seeks to establish a
government presence in neglected areas.206 These areas were near to or
“correlated” with territories inhabited by Afro-Colombians in the Pacific and
other ethnic communities.207 However, neither Afro-Colombians nor any other
ethnic community was consulted.208 Yet, these communities did suffer as a direct
result of the plan. Several members of ethnic communities faced violent
retaliation by guerrillas who were upset by the government’s presence.209 In
Tumaco, six Afro-Colombians who were participating in the consolidated area
program were killed by members of the FARC. 210 It is possible that retaliation
could have been prevented, if the Colombian government communicated with
the Afro-Colombian community and learned more about the tensions in the
Pacific from their perspective.
By ignoring its own rules, the Colombian government has engaged in
policies that negatively impact Afro-Colombians. Such actions by the
Colombian government contradict the objective of consulta previa as described
by the ILO convention: to “guarantee [] respect of the territories and cultural
integrity of peoples and communities.”211

2. Protection of Consulta Previa by the Colombian Constitutional Court
While the legislative and executive ramas212 of the Colombian Government
continue to disregard consulta previa,213 the Constitutional Court has repeatedly
upheld the doctrine and even strengthened its policies.214 Following the 1998
passage of Decree 1320, the Constitutional Court held the enactment of the
decree to be unconstitutional because the government violated consulta previa
by failing to consult with the ethnic communities impacted by the decree.215 The
Court also held the Forestry Law of 2006, the Rural Development Statue of
2007, and the reform to the Mining Code of 2010, to all be unconstitutional on
206
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similar grounds.216 The Constitutional Court also reestablished a prior decision
where the Court explained that ethnic communities had a fundamental right to
consulta previa, since consulta previa protects ethnic communities’
constitutional right of “social, economic, and cultural integrity.”217
In 2011, the Court established some of the responsibilities of the Colombian
Government in relation to consulta previa.218 The Court held that the
government was “responsible for establishing a dialogue between parties based
on good faith and agreeing to a flexible methodology, based on the particular
needs of each community.”219 This decision also established that the consulta
previa process should occur before operations displaced community
members.220 To ensure that the government adheres to consulta previa, the Court
also mandated that the certain watchdog government offices become involved
in the consultation process.221 The Court has also requested that the government
keep track of the abuses committed against Afro-Colombians, which the
government has failed to comply with.222
Despite the seeming indifference of all other branches of the Colombian
Government to the multiple affronts to Afro-Colombian land rights and
livelihood, the Constitutional Court seems to remain the sole government entity
upholding the rights of Afro-Colombians.223 The Court’s role as the sole
champion of consulta previa suggests that while there have been all too few realworld examples of success, the legal principles guiding the process remain a
source of hope for the future.
3. The Future of Consulta Previa under President Santos
While the Colombian executive and legislative branches in the past have
tried to limit consulta previa, there have been some changes to how the current
Colombian Government approaches consulta previa. The current President,
Juan Manual Santos, has tried to strengthen his administration’s commitment to
consulta previa. However, his efforts continue to fall short.224 President Santos
216
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issued a directive which gave more responsibilities to the Directorio Consulta
Previa and detailed a procedure for consulta previa.225 These procedural policies
only detail how the government should proceed with the implementation of
consulta previa and do not assist the communities who need to gain an even
footing with the corporations who will be sitting on the other side of the
bargaining table.226
Furthermore, Santos’ administration seems to be more focused on
streamlining the process of consulta previa to placate those who see the doctrine
as a hurdle for economic development. Claudia Jimenez, director of the Sector
de Minería a Gran Escala,227 noted that “some 7.3 billion in mining investment
has been held up because of consulta previa” and other issues.228 Santos’
Comisión de Infraestructura229 attributed the deficiencies of the development of
infrastructure to problems with implementing consulta previa.230 In an
interview, the Vice Minister of the Interior, Luis Ernesto Gómez focused only
on the time concerns with consulta previa, emphasizing a government desire to
expedite the process.231 The preference for a speedy rather than effective
consultation is yet another indication of the Colombian Government’s
prioritization of economic development over the safety of ethnic communities.
While the current administration seems uninterested in addressing the
fundamental imbalance in bargaining power between the community councils
and sophisticated profit-seeking entities during the consultation process, there
have been some attempts to address past wrongs.232 The current administration
has attempted to rectify the Colombian Government’s past policies towards
Afro-Colombians, a clear example of which is The Victims’ and Land
Restitution Law.233 The law seeks to “provide reparations for victims of the
internal armed conflict and restore land to some five million [internally
displaced peoples].”234 This policy would restore the rights of hundreds of Afro225
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Colombians who have had to leave behind their ancestral lands and move to
urban areas due to the violence in the region.235 However, this policy has failed
to mitigate the violence that continues to plague Afro-Colombians.236 Bands of
guerrillas and bacrim are still present in the Pacific Region and are still fighting
over land, and Afro-Colombians remain at risk.237 The law has yet to be fully
implemented, yet there are already signs that it may be fundamentally flawed
due to the lack of input from those the law seeks to protect.238 Around twenty
land rights activists have already been murdered since it went into effect.239
While the current presidential administration has taken some measures to
revise consulta previa and address past wrongs,240 these measures have fallen
short, as the administration does not seem to recognize the dangers that AfroColombians continue to face.241 Nor does the administration respect the
objectives of consulta previa, which aim to preserve and protect AfroColombian cultural and territorial integrity even when considering economic
development.242 Like most laws, consulta previa will only be as effective as
those willing to enforce it. The Colombian government must take a
fundamentally different approach to consulta previa; one focused on the
mitigation of violence and the factors perpetuating violence. If not, the law will
continue to serve corporate interests and Afro-Colombians will lack any viable
avenue for safety and redress.
IV. A POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENT TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The current protections for Afro-Colombian land do not grant AfroColombians complete control over their lands and fail to provide a clear structure
for adherence. These weak protections expose Afro-Colombians to further
violence. Corporations and bacrim take advantage of the deficiencies in the
system to swindle Afro-Colombians who choose to engage in negotiations or to
physically remove Afro-Colombians from their lands. The Colombian
government historically has played a role in supporting the desires of wealthy
235
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landowners and corporations over the rights of Afro-Colombians. To ensure that
Afro-Colombians can protect their land and culture from future attacks, AfroColombians’ rights must be clearly established and respected. To do so, the
Colombian government must work with Afro-Colombians to strengthen these
policies. Otherwise, the perpetuation of violence will continue to negatively
harm Afro-Colombians in all aspects of their lives.
To create a better system of protection for Afro-Colombians and their land
rights, the Colombian government should change four fundamental aspects of
the consulta previa regime: first, the government should move away from the
current loose legal framework of consulta previa and stop circumventing the
process mandated by consulta previa; second, the government must actively
communicate with Afro-Colombians prior to implementing policies that affect
them; third, the government should use the UNDRIP as a blueprint for creating
a broader scheme of legal rights for ethnic communities; and, fourth, the
government must grant Afro-Colombians the ability to veto proposals from
governmental and corporate entities seeking to use Afro-Colombian land.
The first issue with the process is that consulta previa is only a loose system
of “norms, guidelines, decrees, and presidential directives,”243 which makes it
possible for actors to ignore consulta previa. The current system was not
primarily established by the Colombian legislature, but by the Constitutional
Court through a series of case holdings.244 The fact that most of the structure of
consulta previa comes from case law has led to confusion among corporations
on what the exact protocols and procedures are.245 This creates an avenue to
neglect the system. For actors, such as corporations or bacrim, who simply
refuse to comply with consulta previa, the weak system does not present enough
consequences that will deter them from pursing their economic aspirations
through other means, such as physical removal.246
The lack of structure of consulta previa has also allowed the Colombian
Government to further weaken the system by disregarding it. As discussed
above, the Forestry Law of 2006, the Rural Development Statute of 2007, and
the Mining Code of 2010 were all legal measure that had a clearly foreseeable
impact on Afro-Colombian land.247 However, these measures were drafted and
implemented without any apparent attempt to engage in consulta previa with
243
244
245
246
247

Ocampo & Agudelo, supra note 22.
Id.
Id.
See Brock, supra note 132; see also BURNESS, supra note 17.
Ocampo & Agudelo, supra note 22.

FUENTESCOMMENTPROOFS_5.23.19

428

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

5/23/2019 10:08 AM

[Vol. 33

Afro-Colombians. This disregard in favor of economic development also
provides dangerous encouragement to corporations by reassuring them that the
Colombian government values business over the rights of Afro-Colombians. A
particularly egregious example is the implementation of the National Plan of
Territorial Consolidation.248 Throughout the decision-making process, the
Colombian Government again failed to include Afro-Colombians who would
clearly feel the impacts of the policy during the execution phase.249 This plan
did, however, leave six Afro-Colombians participants dead.250
While not all the measures necessarily exasperate the violence that AfroColombians and their lands face, these actions demonstrate to other actors, such
as corporations and bacrim that the protection of Afro-Colombians is not a
priority for the Colombian Government. These measures show corporations that
efforts such as consulta previa will take a backseat to economic development,
and that they can continue to use Afro-Colombian land as they see fit.
To ensure that the manipulation and disregard for Afro-Colombian land
rights end, the Colombian Government needs to create a stronger system of
consulta previa, and to stop engaging in policies that directly weaken the system
which meant to keep Afro-Colombians on their lands.
The second necessary step the government must make is to communicate
with Afro-Colombians, especially when the Colombian Government is
legislating or carrying out policies that involve Afro-Colombians. As stated
previously, the Colombian Government has consistently refused to participate
in the consultation process with Afro-Colombians when passing laws or issuing
presidential directives.251 Afro-Colombians are better equipped to identify
problems or tensions in the area.252 Communication with Afro-Colombians
could prevent further disastrous results of policy initiatives by the Colombian
government such as the Victims’ and Land Restitution Law. The Colombian
Government should adhere to Law 70, which recognizes that Afro-Colombians
have a constitutional right to consultation when outside actors use their lands,253
and communicate with Afro-Colombians when creating policies that will affect
them.254
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The third change that the Colombian Government should adopt is to
incorporate the UNDRIP principles into Colombian law. UNDRIP is an
instrument initiated by the United Nations to end discrimination of indigenous
people and ensure their protection.255 UNDRIP was adopted by the general
assembly on September 13, 2007.256 While UNDRIP specifically applies to
indigenous groups,257 since Afro-Colombians share a similar status to
indigenous groups in Colombia, and the Colombian government could adopt an
expanded version of the declaration that includes Afro-Colombians. The
instrument would be useful in protecting Afro-Colombians because it is a “major
step . . . for human rights,” as it provides for broader protections for indigenous
groups.258 UNDRIP is non-legally-binding, but, despite its non-binding nature
the Colombian government abstained from voting on the declaration in 2007.259
The Colombian Government cited conflicting provisions within its
constitution as a barrier to adopting UNDRIP outright. However, the Colombian
Government should still use UNDRIP as a guideline and implement a law with
similar protections for Afro-Colombians as those afforded to indigenous groups
under UNDRIP. UNDRIP-style laws would provide stronger protections for
Afro-Colombians than ILO 169, the treaty that the Colombian version of
consulta previa is based on. The declaration holds that the forcible removal of
indigenous people should never occur.260 The adoption of this proposal into
Colombian law would send a clear signal to corporations and bacrim that past
practices of violent removal will no longer be tolerated.
UNDRIP also proclaims that States should obtain the free, prior, and
informed consent of indigenous groups before “the approval of any project or
legislative . . . measure that may affect them.”261 The passage of a law which
contains a similar provision would limit the Colombian government’s ability to
pass laws that affect Afro-Colombians without first consulting with AfroColombians.
The fourth—and most critical—change the Colombian Government must
make is the creation of a legally binding veto power for Afro-Colombian
255
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communities. Some legal scholars have also stated that the provisions in
UNDRIP seem to provide a sufficient legal basis for granting indigenous groups
a veto power.262 The Colombian Government; however, should move beyond
UNDRIP and establish that Afro-Colombians have definite right to veto any
proposed activity on their lands. The ability to reject certain projects would
provide Afro-Colombians a chance to ensure the protection of their lands. If
Afro-Colombians had a veto power, they would no longer be forced to remain
in a negotiation process with corporations where completion of the project is a
foregone conclusion. Afro-Colombian community councils would instead be
able to withdrawal their approval and corporations would be legally bound to
respect that decision. The creation of a legally binding veto power would also
demonstrate to corporations, and to bacrim that the Colombian Government
recognizes, and respects Afro-Colombian land and culture. Hopefully, this
would end the practice of corporations hiring bacrim263 to openly remove AfroColombians by force, without fear of legal consequences.
These four proposals, if implemented, will deter further assaults on to AfroColombian lands by corporations and bacrim, and, if not, these proposals will at
least provide a vehicle for punishment if corporations or bacrim attempt to take
Afro-Colombian land.
V. CRITICISMS OF CONSULTA PREVIA
While this Comment wishes to improve Colombia’s current implementation
of Law 70 by strengthening its approach to consulta previa, there are several
criticisms of the basic principles of consulta previa. This section will discuss
two criticisms from the point of view of ethnic community leaders and one
criticism from the point of view of corporations.
Ethnic or indigenous leaders in other parts of Latin America have expressed
frustration that consulta previa does not provide ethnic communities sufficient
rights over their lands.264 Many projects which are presented to the communities
are dealing with advanced engineering or technical issues, and negotiations are
often couched in highly technical jargon. As a result, communities have no way
of knowing the true extent to which those projects could harm their lands.265
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This is a valid criticism that points out a real shortcoming of the consulta previa
process, but is one that the Colombian Government can attempt to alleviate by
providing more educational resources and technical guidance to AfroColombians community councils.
The second criticism leaders of ethnic communities have concerns the
current structure of consulta previa, which is regulated by domestic
governments and not international organizations.266 Community leaders argue
that international regulation would provide more protections to indigenous and
ethnic communities.267 Their national governments charged with representing
these communities have repeatedly limited the protections granted in the original
ILO 169.268 If the Colombian Government were to adopt the principles of
UNDRIP into its domestic laws, this would expand the current set of protections
towards indigenous and ethnic communities.
Investors have also had problems with consulta previa due to the obstacles
it creates for their projects. In Colombia, certain investors, continue to disregard
Law 70 and the legal title of Afro-Colombians, and continue to forcibly take
lands.269 For the investors who do wish to adhere to the law and participate in
the consulta previa process, the disorder of the system and its complexities
makes the process frustrating and difficult.270 Due to the disarray of the system,
consulta previa is seen as a barrier to development by some.271 Yet, this problem
could be addressed if the Colombian government were to create clear laws on
consulta previa instead of relying on the loose jurisprudential standards created
by the Constitutional Court.
CONCLUSION
With the passing of Law 70 and implementation of consulta previa, AfroColombians have moved from being completely ignored by the Colombian
government and have a defined role as a stakeholder in Colombia’s economic
development projects in the Pacific Region. The promise of consulta previa is
to provide a mechanism for Afro-Colombians to protect their territory, as well
266
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as their cultural identity, while also allowing them to work with the Colombian
government and future investors to take part in the project of Colombian
economic development on their own terms.
While Afro-Colombians in the Pacific Region now have some form of
agency—in that they hold legal title to areas of vital importance to the
Colombian economy, they continue to be ignored, abused, and abandoned by
their government and fellow citizens. The Colombian government has failed in
its implementation of the consulta previa regime. The government should ensure
the protection and safety of Afro-Colombians as corporations and bacrim will
continue to manipulate the process or illegally force Afro-Colombians off their
own land.
As the Colombian government makes strides in its relations with the FARC,
other guerrilla groups, and paramilitary groups to end the half a century of
bloodshed, it is vital that the government ensure that all brutal violence within
its borders ends, so that all its citizens may share equally in the promise of peace.
To do so, the Colombian government should establish a clear policy on consulta
previa. Without a stronger system of consulta previa, Colombia will not be able
to move beyond its violent history and Afro-Colombians will continue to be
harassed and murdered.
MARIA CLAUDIA FUENTES*

*
Notes and Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review, Volume 33; J.D. Candidate, Emory
University School of Law (2019); Bachelor of Arts, University of Florida, in Political Science and Government,
History (2016).

